Question 2 of UNISA’s January/February 2025 MAC4866 Information Strategy paper, worth 30 marks, is a cyber-risk question set on a teaching hospital that is about to put live surgery on the internet. It runs in three steps: identify the risks, examine what an attack would do, and recommend controls that do not destroy the benefit of the system. The question is described in our own words below; the answers are TheronGroup’s.
The case
Luthuli Hospital (LHTAL), north of Pretoria, is a large teaching hospital with a strong reputation, above all for surgical training. Three of its nine operating theatres have a viewing gallery, so students can watch a surgeon operate and then question the surgeon or their lecturer, and later operate in the same theatres while staff and fellow students watch. The galleries hold only a few students.
LHTAL’s IT department has built a web-based Theatre Information System, TIS10. It lets students join a video conference with a lecturer during an operation from anywhere in the world, see the surgical team at work and discuss the procedure as it happens. It also lets LHTAL watch operations at the hospitals it collaborates with, in South Africa and abroad, and give advice and guidance. TIS10 is still being tested and has not yet been implemented.
Required. 2.1 Identify and discuss three key cyber risks of implementing and using TIS10. (6) 2.2 Examine the impact a cyberattack on TIS10 would have on patient safety, on the privacy of data and on the hospital’s reputation, given that LHTAL is a teaching hospital with a global network of collaborators. (9) 2.3 Recommend and discuss strategies that would mitigate the risks in 2.1 while keeping the functionality and benefits of TIS10. (15)
2.1 Three key cyber risks (6 marks)
Six marks for three risks means two marks each: one for naming the risk as TIS10 creates it, one for what it exposes. Each risk below comes from something the case says TIS10 does.
| What TIS10 does | The risk it creates |
|---|---|
| Carries live theatre video over web technology to anyone, anywhere | Unauthorised access to a live operation |
| Connects LHTAL to partner hospitals worldwide | Compromise through a collaborating hospital |
| Is still in testing, and is relied on during surgery | Interruption or manipulation during a procedure |
Risk 1: unauthorised access to a live operation.
- The gallery could only be entered by walking into it. A web-based conference that students can join from anywhere in the world can also be joined, or intercepted, by someone who has no right to be there.
- What is exposed is the patient: an identifiable person, undergoing surgery, in a named theatre at a named hospital. That is health information, which is special personal information under the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 (POPIA). A patient who agreed to be watched by LHTAL’s students did not agree to be watched by anyone else.
Risk 2: compromise through a collaborating hospital.
- TIS10 lets LHTAL connect to its partner hospitals and lets them connect to LHTAL, so the network is only as secure as its weakest partner. LHTAL controls neither the partners’ systems nor their staff.
- A credential issued to a surgeon at a hospital abroad reaches into LHTAL’s theatres. A breach at the partner becomes a breach at LHTAL without anything failing at LHTAL itself.
Risk 3: interruption or manipulation during a procedure.
- A denial-of-service attack, a ransomware infection or an altered video feed strikes TIS10 while an operation is under way. A system still in testing is more likely to go live with untested settings and unpatched software that make such an attack easier.
- What is exposed here is clinical, not commercial. The attack reaches the operation itself and removes guidance that a surgeon or a supervising lecturer is relying on at that moment. For TIS10, availability is a patient-safety matter, not a service level.
Where the marks are lost. A list of generic threats (phishing, malware, weak passwords) earns little, because none of them is tied to TIS10. Start from what the system does, as the table does, and keep the consequences short: the full impact discussion belongs to 2.2, and repeating it here earns the marks only once.
2.2 The impact of a cyberattack on TIS10 (9 marks)
Nine marks across three named headings means three points under each. Read every impact against the two facts the requirement highlights: LHTAL is a teaching hospital, and its collaboration is global.
Patient safety
- An operation interrupted while in progress. If TIS10 goes down during surgery, the surgeon giving or receiving advice, or the lecturer supervising a student who is operating, is cut off at the moment the guidance is needed.
- A manipulated feed and a corrupted record. An attacker who alters the video can show a remote adviser something other than what is on the table. An attack that alters or deletes the recordings and logs also removes LHTAL’s ability to establish afterwards what was done, and on whose advice.
- Surgery postponed. Where an operation depends on advice exchanged over TIS10, shutting the system down to clean it removes that advice, and delayed surgery is clinical harm to the patients waiting for it. The galleries over three of the nine theatres keep local teaching going, but only for the few students they seat.
Privacy of data
- Disclosure of the most sensitive kind. TIS10 carries live and recorded video of identifiable patients in surgery. Health information is special personal information under POPIA and is also protected by medical ethics. As the responsible party, LHTAL must notify the Information Regulator and every affected patient of a security compromise (section 22).
- Exposure across borders. Because the collaboration is global, the same footage may be viewed or stored in several jurisdictions at once. A breach raises the questions of whose law governs and to whom LHTAL must report.
- Students and staff exposed too. TIS10 shows the surgical team and the participating students, so a breach discloses the conduct and competence of identifiable professionals and trainees as well as the patient’s condition.
Hospital reputation
- The thing LHTAL is known for is damaged. LHTAL’s standing rests on surgical training, and TIS10 is what takes that training beyond the gallery. A breach strikes at the institution’s distinctive strength, not at a side service.
- Partner hospitals withdraw. The partners share the risk of TIS10 without sharing control of it, so an incident gives them a reason to leave, and the collaborative network is itself the asset LHTAL’s reputation depends on.
- Patients refuse to be observed. Consent to be watched in a teaching theatre is given one patient at a time. A publicised breach makes consent harder to obtain, which reduces the operations available for teaching and weakens LHTAL as a teaching hospital.
Where the marks are lost. Three headings at nine marks is a three-three-three split, and an answer with five points on privacy and one on reputation loses marks it cannot recover. Every impact should also carry one of the two facts the requirement names, teaching or global collaboration; a hospital-in-general impact earns less.
2.3 Strategies to mitigate the risks while keeping TIS10’s benefits (15 marks)
TheronGroup’s answer organises the strategies by the core functions of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework: identify, protect, detect, respond and recover, with version 2.0 (2024) adding govern above them. The framework says what an organisation must do to manage cyber risk and leaves the choice of products to it.
The requirement makes keeping the functionality a condition. Every strategy below therefore removes a way of attacking TIS10, not a use of it, and each is cheapest to build in now, while the system is still being tested.
| NIST function | Strategies | Risk addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Identify | 1–3 | All three: who and what must be protected |
| Protect | 4–10 | Mainly risks 1 and 2: keeping unauthorised users out |
| Detect | 11–13 | All three: finding an attack early |
| Respond and recover | 14–15 | Mainly risk 3: keeping an incident from becoming a clinical event |
Identify: who and what TIS10 must protect
- One identity for every user, issued centrally. LHTAL gives every student, lecturer, surgeon and partner-hospital user a unique identity. This is possible because TIS10’s users are a known group of trainees and partners, not the public.
- The recordings treated as a separate asset. LHTAL decides what TIS10 records, how long each recording is kept, who may retrieve it and where it is stored. A live session is exposed for an hour; an archive is exposed for years.
- Partner hospitals bound by written agreement. Each agreement sets who at the partner may hold a TIS10 credential, what happens when their staff leave, and how quickly the partner must report an incident. The partner’s security becomes LHTAL’s business before any technology is configured.
Protect: keeping unauthorised users out
- Multi-factor authentication on every account. A second factor closes the most likely way in: a student’s password guessed, shared or sold.
- Access by role. A student observing, a student operating, a supervising lecturer and an advising partner get different rights, so a compromised student account cannot reach the recording archive.
- Encryption in transit and at rest. The video crosses the public internet to reach students worldwide; encryption makes an intercepted stream useless and costs TIS10 nothing in function.
- Digital certificates at both ends. Certificates verify the sender and receiver of every stream. LHTAL manages their renewal, because users who see expired-certificate warnings learn to click through the warning that would expose an impostor.
- Admission by the lecturer. The supervising lecturer opens each session and admits each participant. The session stays open to every invited student and closed to everyone else, with no limit on who may be invited.
- TIS10 on its own network segment. Behind a firewall, separated from the rest of the hospital network, a compromise of the teaching system cannot become a route to patient records or hospital administration.
- Patching and secure configuration finished in testing. TIS10 goes live already up to date, rather than being patched after it is in use.
Detect: finding an attack early
- Central logging and monitoring. Session logs feed alerts on events that should never happen, such as a login from an unexpected country or two sessions open on one credential.
- Intrusion detection and prevention on the TIS10 segment. TIS10’s traffic is narrow and predictable, which makes anything unusual easy to see, and the sooner an attack is found the easier it is to contain.
- Users trained to report. Students, surgeons and lecturers are the first to see a certificate warning or a stranger in a session, so security awareness is part of compulsory induction for every TIS10 user.
Respond and recover: keeping an incident from becoming a clinical event
- A tested incident response plan that includes a clinical decision. The plan names who may stop a session, who tells the surgeon, and who decides whether an operation continues without remote guidance. That decision cannot be made for the first time in the middle of an incident.
- The gallery as the fallback, with backups for recovery. The galleries and local supervision work without TIS10. A documented and rehearsed fallback to them, together with backups from which TIS10 and its recordings can be restored, lets LHTAL take the system down quickly when it must without stopping surgery or teaching.
Recommendation. LHTAL should put all five functions in place together, under the management oversight that the framework’s govern function describes, before TIS10 goes live. Each one protects the system’s benefit, remote teaching and global collaboration, while removing a way of attacking it.
Where the marks are lost. The quickest way to remove the risk is to close TIS10 to remote students or end the link with partner hospitals, and it earns nothing: the requirement makes keeping the functionality and benefits a condition. Test each strategy by asking whether a student abroad can still join and a partner can still be advised once it is in place.
Studying MAC4866
MAC4866 examines strategy and information-systems models through a case, so the marks go to applying the model to the organisation described. The MAC4866 course holds 14 topic notes and 23 packs covering the 2011 to 2025 sittings and assignments, at R3 000 a year.