TheronGroup of Consultants

80/20 Golden Rule · Pareto Optimality

Past paper

CSP-04 Company Secretarial Practice, 2025 assignment: every question answered

CGISA's 2025 Company Secretarial Practice assignment answered in full: risk committees, whistleblowing, directors, nomination and the company secretary.

CGISA · CSP-04 Company Secretarial Practice · 2025 assignment

CGISA's first-semester 2025 assignment for Company Secretarial Practice (CSP-04), due on 4 April 2025, set four questions of 25 marks each. Every one of them is answered in full below.

Each question is described in our own words; three of them are built on published articles, which are summarised rather than reproduced. The answers are TheronGroup’s, written to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the Companies Regulations, the JSE Listings Requirements and King V, and every provision is cited where it is used.

What the assignment rewards

The assignment rewards applying the law to the facts given. A risk committee, a whistleblowing line or a nomination committee earns marks only when you show what it would have done with the particular failures in the scenario.


00The assignment at a glance

01TD Bank: a record fine and the warnings it ignoredQuestion 1 · 25 marks

The question is built on two published commentaries on TD Bank’s money-laundering settlement, in which the bank paid a record fine, put by the extract at more than R3 billion, after years of ignored internal warnings. The facts the extract gives:

  • 92% of the bank’s transactions went unmonitored for money laundering;
  • a “flat cost” budget meant no new compliance spending while transaction volumes and revenue grew sharply;
  • a widely used new payment service, Zelle, was launched before the bank knew how to monitor it;
  • front-line staff were not trained to spot money-laundering red flags, customer due diligence failed, and some employees colluded with launderers, taking gift cards and bribes and accepting bags of cash without question;
  • the external auditor’s report highlighted the sheer volume of failures across the anti-money-laundering programme; and
  • the extract suggests whistleblowers may have helped the authorities build the case, and argues that better compliance would have cost a fraction of the fine.

Required (13 marks). With reference to the risks noted in the scenario, explain how a risk committee could have alleviated the fine TD Bank incurred.

1.1 What a risk committee would have done with the warnings this bank ignored (13 marks)

Where a risk committee comes from, and what it can be given

The board may create it and give it real authority. Section 72(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 allows the board, except to the extent the memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise, to appoint any number of committees of directors and to delegate to a committee any of the authority of the board; section 72(2)(c) gives the committee the full authority of the board in respect of a matter referred to it, and section 72(2)(a) allows it to include persons who are not directors, provided none of them is ineligible or disqualified under section 69 and none of them votes.

But delegation does not move the duty. Section 72(3) provides that the creation of a committee, the delegation of a power to it, or action taken by it does not alone satisfy or constitute compliance by a director with the duty section 76 imposes. So a risk committee is not a place to put a problem; it is the machinery by which the board discharges a duty it keeps.

The Companies Regulations, 2011 supply the one committee the law compels for many companies. Regulation 43, made under section 72(4), requires the companies it covers to appoint a social and ethics committee and prescribes its composition and its functions. That committee is not a risk committee, but its mandate overlaps with financial crime and with the organisation’s standing in society, and a board that has one has somewhere to start.

The JSE Listings Requirements assume the committee for a listed issuer. Paragraph 3.84(d) requires an issuer, in compliance with the governance code, to appoint an audit committee and a remuneration committee and, if required given the nature of the business and the composition of the board, a risk and nomination committee, and requires the composition of the committees, a brief description of their mandates and the number of meetings held to be disclosed in the annual report.

King V is a voluntary code and it is the level that says what the committee is for. Principle 8 of King V makes the governing body accountable for governing risk in a way that enables the organisation to sustain and optimise its strategy and objectives, and recommended practice 91 allows it to delegate the risk-related responsibilities that follow to a committee responsible for risk governance. Principle 9 does the same for compliance, and recommended practice 96 permits the compliance responsibilities to be delegated to that same risk committee – which is exactly the pairing this bank needed.

The risks the scenario names, and what the committee would have done with each

Ninety-two per cent of transactions unmonitored is a control failure with a number attached to it, and a number is what a committee acts on. Recommended practice 93(c) of King V requires the design and implementation of effective risk responses so that risk exposures are aligned with established risk appetite and tolerance levels. A monitoring coverage figure is a tolerance measure; a committee with that figure on its agenda quarterly cannot let it drift for a decade.

A decade of internal warnings that reached nobody is a reporting failure, and the committee is the reporting line. Recommended practice 93(e) requires risk management to be integrated and embedded into day-to-day operations and decision-making as part of the organisational culture, and recommended practice 94 requires the governing body to consider periodic assurance on the effectiveness of the risk function and the internal control framework. Warnings that stop at the head of compliance are not assurance.

A flat compliance budget against rising transaction volumes is a resourcing decision the committee should have refused. Recommended practice 92 requires the governing body to consider and approve the policies, frameworks and standards that give effect to its direction on risk management, and a policy the organisation has not funded has not been given effect. The committee’s function here is to put the cost of the control next to the cost of the failure and make the board choose in the open.

A new payments service launched without a means of monitoring it is a change the committee should have gated. Recommended practice 93(f) requires an iterative approach to risk that is responsive to changing conditions and emerging risks. A product approval that does not carry a monitoring plan is an emerging risk taken on deliberately, and it belongs on the committee’s agenda before launch and not after.

Front-line staff who cannot identify a red flag is a training failure, and it is measurable. Recommended practice 98(a) of King V requires compliance to be integrated into the broader organisation-wide risk management system. Training completion, and testing of what was learned, are the metrics; the committee’s role is to ask for them and to disbelieve a hundred-per-cent completion rate that comes with no test results.

Employees conspiring with launderers for gift cards is conduct risk, and it is the committee’s business as much as the auditor’s. Section 94(7)(g) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires the audit committee to receive and deal appropriately with concerns or complaints, from within or outside the company, relating to accounting practices, internal audit, the financial statements, internal financial controls or any related matter. Where a risk committee exists alongside it, the two must have a single, published channel between them or complaints fall down the gap.

The external auditor’s report was the escalation nobody used. Section 94(7)(f)(iii) allows the audit committee to comment in its report on the financial statements, the accounting practices and the internal financial control of the company. A finding of this magnitude, recorded by the auditor and not carried into that report, is the point at which the governance failed rather than the compliance function.

How that alleviates the fine, which is the question asked

A regulator prices cooperation and self-correction. The fine reflected a decade of unremedied failure. A functioning risk committee produces a documented trail of identification, escalation, decision and remediation, and that trail is the mitigation a regulator can see – not an assertion that the board cared.

It shortens the period of exposure, which is what compounds a penalty. Each of the failures above was capable of being caught in the year it arose. A committee meeting quarterly against a risk register converts a ten-year failure into a series of one-year ones, each with a recorded response.

It protects the directors personally, and that is a separate benefit. Section 76(4)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 makes the business judgement rule available only to a director who took reasonably diligent steps to become informed. Committee papers, minutes and the register of risks are how that is proved, and section 73(6)(b) requires every resolution adopted by the board to be minuted.

Textbook opinion stands last and is persuasive only. The settled view is that a risk committee earns its place only where it has its own charter, its own agenda and a direct reporting line to the board, and that a committee which receives management’s own risk report and approves it has added a meeting and nothing else. That is opinion and it is cited as such.

Required (12 marks). The extract says whistleblowers could have been material in helping TD Bank avoid the fine and the reputational damage. Discuss the statement, saying whether you agree with it and why.

1.2 Whether whistleblowers could have saved this bank the fine and the reputation (12 marks)

The proposition is agreed with, but with two qualifications: a disclosure only helps where there is a system to receive it, and the protection the law gives the discloser is what makes the system work. Both are matters the company secretary is expected to know.

Why the proposition is right in principle

A disclosure reaches the board faster than any control. The failures in this scenario – unmonitored transactions, an unfunded compliance function, staff taking bribes – were known to people inside the bank for years. No monitoring system detects a monitoring system that has been switched off; a person does.

The law makes the channel compulsory for the companies most exposed to this. Section 159(7)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires a public company or a state-owned company, directly or indirectly, to establish and maintain a system to receive disclosures confidentially and to act on them, and section 159(7)(b) requires it routinely to publicise the availability of that system. A bank that has that system and acts on what comes through it is doing what section 159 assumes.

The protection is wide enough to make disclosure rational. Section 159(4) gives a shareholder, director, company secretary, prescribed officer or employee, a registered trade union representing employees or another employee representative, a supplier of goods or services or an employee of such a supplier, qualified privilege in respect of the disclosure and immunity from any civil, criminal or administrative liability for it.

And it is backed by a remedy and a presumption. Section 159(5) entitles the discloser to compensation from a person who causes him detriment, or threatens to, because of the disclosure, and section 159(6) presumes that any such conduct or threat occurred because of the disclosure unless the person responsible shows satisfactory evidence of another reason. That reversal is what makes retaliation expensive.

No agreement can take it away. Section 159(2) makes void any provision of a memorandum of incorporation or rules, or any agreement, to the extent that it is inconsistent with section 159 or purports to limit, set aside or negate its effect. A settlement or an employment contract that buys silence is worth nothing against it.

The Companies Act adds to the Protected Disclosures Act rather than replacing it. Section 159(1)(a) provides that the rights and protections it creates are in addition to and not in substitution for those established by the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000, and section 159(1)(b) applies that Act to a disclosure by an employee irrespective of whether it would otherwise apply.

And the subject matter fits this scenario exactly. Section 159(3)(b)(ii) covers a disclosure that the discloser reasonably believed showed that the company had failed, or was failing, to comply with a statutory obligation to which it was subject, and section 159(3)(b)(v) covers a contravention of any other legislation in a manner that could expose the company to an actual or contingent risk of liability or is inherently prejudicial to its interests. An anti-money-laundering programme that is not being run is both.

The qualifications, which are where the disagreement lies

A protected disclosure is worth nothing to a company that does not act on it. Section 159(3)(a) lists the recipients to whom a good-faith disclosure attracts the protection – among them the Commission, the Companies Tribunal, the Panel, a regulatory authority, an exchange, a legal adviser, a director, a prescribed officer, the company secretary, the auditor, the internal auditor, the board or a committee. A bank whose internal recipients did nothing for a decade drives its own people to the external ones, and the external ones are the regulator.

So the fine was not avoided by the absence of a whistleblower; it was earned by the response to one. The scenario’s own words are that warnings fell on deaf ears. Section 88(2)(c) makes it the duty of the company secretary to report to the board any failure by the company or a director to comply with the memorandum of incorporation, the rules or the Act, and a report made and not acted on becomes evidence against the board rather than for it.

Confidentiality is what the system stands or falls on. Section 159(7)(a) requires the system to receive disclosures confidentially. Where the discloser’s identity leaks, the protection in section 159(4) and section 159(5) becomes litigation rather than a shield, and the next person says nothing.

And the code asks for the culture section 159 cannot compel. Principle 2 of King V requires the governing body to govern ethics in a way that supports an ethical culture, and Principle 9 makes it responsible for compliance with applicable laws and for the non-binding rules and standards the organisation adopts. Recommended practice 98(b) asks that compliance be understood not only for the obligations it creates but for the rights and protections it affords – which is the whistleblower’s protection seen from the board’s side.

And the textbook view puts the weight on the listener rather than the speaker. The difference between a bank that is fined and one that is not is rarely whether someone spoke, but whether the second and third people who heard it wrote it down and passed it on. That is opinion and it is cited as such.

02Superiori: a dominant CEO and a board that never pushes backQuestion 2 · 25 marks

The question adapts a column by an anonymous non-executive director (Board Agenda, June 2024). Philip, chief executive of the long-established Superiori company (a fictitious name), invites the writer to join his board as a non-executive director. The company showed early promise but has drifted: its share price has performed poorly and activist shareholders are circling.

Before accepting, the writer speaks to board members, the audit partner, the broker and the lawyers, and attends a board meeting. The picture is consistent:

  • a dominant chief executive who is not used to challenge and does not welcome it;
  • directors, executive and non-executive alike, who go along with him, with debate all but absent;
  • contract opportunities given to the CEO with carte blanche, which went wrong and which the board is now struggling to control;
  • weak, pliant non-executives, and executives, especially in finance, who are more so;
  • a superficial performance evaluation; and
  • succession planning so neglected that the company will keep drifting without significant change to the board.

Required (16 marks). Distinguish between the responsibilities of non-executive directors and those of executive directors.

2.1 The responsibilities of a non-executive director and those of an executive director (16 marks)

The starting point is that the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not distinguish between them. Section 66(1) vests the business and affairs of a company in its board and gives the board the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company except to the extent the Act or the memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise, and section 76 applies to every director alike. The distinction is one of role and of time, not of duty, and the answer below keeps the two apart in that order.

What is identical, and must be said first

The duties are the same. Section 76(3)(a), (b) and (c) require every director to exercise his powers and perform his functions in good faith and for a proper purpose, in the best interests of the company, and with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. The words carrying out the same functions are where the difference enters: they measure a director against his own role and not against a uniform standard.

The liabilities are the same. Section 77(2)(a) makes a director liable in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to a breach of fiduciary duty for loss caused by a breach of section 76(2) or section 76(3)(a) or (b), and section 77(2)(b) makes him liable in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict for a breach of section 76(3)(c) or of any provision of the Act or the memorandum of incorporation. Section 77(3) adds the specific liabilities, and section 77(6) makes liability under section 77(3) joint and several.

The conflict procedure is the same. Section 75(5)(a) to (g) applies to any director who has a personal financial interest in a matter before the board or who knows that a related person has one, and section 75(1)(a)(ii) extends it to a prescribed officer.

Delegation does not change any of it. Section 72(3) provides that the creation of a committee, the delegation of a power to it or action taken by it does not alone constitute compliance by a director with the duty imposed by section 76. A non-executive director who sits only on a committee is not answerable for less.

And the Act’s definition of a director is wider than the board. Section 66(10), with regulation 38 of the Companies Regulations, 2011, makes a person who exercises general executive control over the business a prescribed officer whatever his title, and section 75(1)(a) applies the conflict provisions to him. So an executive who is not on the board still carries much of what follows.

The executive director

He manages, and the board’s authority over management is delegated to him. Section 66(1) vests the business and affairs of the company in the board; the executive director is the person to whom the board’s day-to-day authority is delegated, and Principle 7 of King V governs the appointment of, and delegation to, management. The relationship runs downward: the board sets the direction and the executive executes it.

He is in full-time salaried employment and is categorised accordingly. Paragraph 3.84(f)(i) of the JSE Listings Requirements categorises as executive those directors who are involved in the management of the company or in its full-time salaried employment or that of any of its subsidiaries.

He owns the information. The papers, the forecasts, the risk register and the management accounts originate with him, and the quality of the board’s decision depends on what he puts in front of it. That is why section 76(4)(a) makes the business judgement rule available only to a director who took reasonably diligent steps to become informed: the executive is the source of that information and cannot rely on his own summary of it.

He is subject to a statutory reporting line he cannot shorten. Section 94(7)(g) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires the audit committee to receive and deal appropriately with concerns and complaints; section 88(2)(c) requires the company secretary to report a failure to comply to the board. An executive who filters what reaches either has interfered with the machinery rather than managed it.

He cannot sit on the audit committee. Section 94(4)(b)(i) requires each member not to be involved in the day-to-day management of the business, or to have been so involved at any time during the previous financial year, and section 94(4)(b)(ii) excludes a prescribed officer or full-time employee of the company or of a related company, or one who has been such within the previous three financial years.

And an issuer must have one particular executive. Paragraph 3.84(g) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires all issuers to have an executive financial director, and paragraph 3.84(h) requires the audit committee to consider annually and satisfy itself of the appropriateness of the expertise and experience of that financial director and the issuer to report to shareholders that it has done so.

The non-executive director

He does not manage; he directs, and the difference is deliberate. Paragraph 3.84(f)(ii) of the JSE Listings Requirements categorises as non-executive those directors who are not involved in the day-to-day management of the business and are not full-time salaried employees of the company or of any subsidiary.

His first responsibility is constructive challenge, and this scenario is what its absence looks like. The board described in the extract went along with the chief executive, and challenge, push-back and debate were absent. Recommended practice 38 of King V requires members of the governing body, collectively and individually, to be accountable for upholding independence in decision making in the best interests of the organisation. That is the responsibility that distinguishes the role.

Independence is categorised and it is not the same as being non-executive. Recommended practice 41 of King V allows the governing body to categorise a non-executive member as independent only where it concludes that there is no interest, position, association or relationship which, judged from the perspective of a reasonable and informed third party, is likely to unduly influence or cause bias in decision making. Recommended practice 42 lists the factors that indicate otherwise, and paragraph 3.84(f)(iii) of the JSE Listings Requirements adds that a director who participates in a share incentive or option scheme is not independent.

Where the chairman is not independent, a lead independent director carries the role. Recommended practice 45 of King V recommends that the governing body appoint an independent non-executive member as chairperson, and recommended practice 46 requires a lead independent position where it does not; paragraph 3.84(c) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires an appointed chief executive officer and a chairman who are not the same person, and requires the chairman to be independent or a lead independent director to be appointed. A dominant chief executive is precisely the condition that position exists for.

He staffs the committees the executive may not. Section 94(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 confines audit committee membership to directors who satisfy its tests; recommended practice 60 of King V recommends that all members of the audit committee be independent non-executive members and recommended practice 61 that its chairperson be one; paragraph 3.84(a) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires the nomination committee to comprise only non-executive directors of whom the majority are independent.

He is responsible for succession and for the composition of the board itself. Recommended practice 33 of King V requires a succession plan for the membership of the governing body and its committees and for the critical roles of chairperson and lead independent member, and recommended practice 34 makes the governing body accountable for nominating suitable candidates. The extract records that succession planning had been neglected; that is a non-executive failure and not a management one.

He evaluates, including the chief executive. Recommended practice 44 of King V requires the evaluation of the governing body’s performance to include criteria for assessing its management of conflicts of interest and its consideration of the independence of members. A superficial evaluation, which is what the extract describes, is a failure of the same responsibility.

And he brings independent judgement to the specific decisions the executive is closest to. The carte blanche given to the chief executive to pursue contract opportunities is the point at which the non-executives should have required the authority to be defined, the exposure quantified and the reporting fixed – and the point at which section 76(3)(c) will be measured against them if it was not.

Required (9 marks). As company secretary, give Superiori’s concerned shareholders a breakdown of how the inadequate performance evaluation, the neglected succession planning and the dominant CEO have contributed to the company’s poor economic performance.

2.2 A breakdown for shareholders: how these governance failures reached the share price (9 marks)

To: The shareholders of the Superiori Company From: The company secretary Subject: Performance evaluation, succession planning and the concentration of authority, and their effect on the company’s results

This note answers the request for a breakdown of how the governance matters raised have affected the company’s economic performance. It deals with them in the order in which they compound: authority, then evaluation, then succession.

A dominant chief executive concentrates decision-making authority the Act vests in the board as a whole. Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 vests the business and affairs of the company in its board. Where the board defers rather than decides, the company obtains the judgement of one person on every material matter and pays for the errors of one person as well. The contract opportunities pursued under an open authority, which have since hit trouble, are the direct cost of that concentration.

Authority that is not defined cannot be monitored, and what is not monitored is not corrected early. A mandate given without limits produces no reporting obligation, so the board learned of the difficulty when it became a problem rather than when it became a risk. The cost of a bad contract discovered late is the cost of the contract plus the cost of the delay.

Absent challenge, the board’s papers stop being decision documents. Where the agenda and the papers are set to be approved rather than tested, the board’s minute records assent and nothing else. Section 76(4)(a) makes the business judgement rule available only to a director who took reasonably diligent steps to become informed; a board whose record shows no enquiry has no defence, and the company carries the exposure.

Superficial performance evaluation removes the mechanism by which a board corrects itself. Recommended practice 44 of King V requires the evaluation of the governing body’s performance to include measurement criteria for assessing the ethical and effective management of conflicts of interest and the consideration of the independence of members. An evaluation that measures nothing produces no change, and a board that does not change does not improve the results it oversees.

Neglected succession planning means the board cannot replace what it cannot evaluate. Recommended practice 33 of King V requires a succession plan for the membership of the governing body and its committees and for the critical roles, and recommended practice 32 recommends staggered rotation so that new expertise arrives while institutional knowledge is retained. Without either, the composition of this board has not changed in step with the business, and the extract’s own conclusion is that the drift continues without significant changes in the non-executive and some executive directors.

The weakness is concentrated where it does most damage – in finance. The board’s oversight of financial reporting is exercised through the audit committee, whose members section 94(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires to be outside day-to-day management. Where the finance function is itself pliant, both the executive and the oversight sides of financial reporting are weak at once, and the company’s numbers become the last place a problem shows.

The market prices governance, and the activists are the evidence of that. The extract records a poor share price performance, activists periodically circling, and the causes of their concern being these very matters. A discount for governance is not an abstraction: it is a lower multiple applied to the same earnings, and it raises the cost of the equity the company needs.

The remedies are within the shareholders’ own hands, which is why this note sets them out. Section 71(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 allows a director to be removed by ordinary resolution of the persons entitled to vote in an election of that director, despite anything to the contrary in the memorandum of incorporation, the rules or any agreement, and section 71(2) requires notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Section 61(3) allows shareholders holding at least 10% of the voting rights to demand a shareholders meeting.

And what the board is doing about it. A lead independent director where the chairman is not independent, as recommended practice 46 of King V and paragraph 3.84(c) of the JSE Listings Requirements provide; an externally facilitated evaluation of the board against recommended practice 44; a written succession plan under recommended practice 33 with staggered rotation under recommended practice 32; and a delegation of authority framework that fixes the limits of the chief executive’s mandate and the reporting that goes with it. Each of these is recorded in the board minute as section 73(6)(b) requires, so that shareholders can see the date on which it was taken.

03AYO Technology Solutions: two directors who could not do the jobQuestion 3 · 25 marks

The question is built on a Daily Maverick report of February 2022. The JSE disqualified Mbuso Khoza and Telang Ntsasa, former non-executive directors of AYO Technology Solutions and members of its audit and risk committee, from serving on the board of any listed company for five years.

  • AYO listed in December 2017. Its unaudited interim results for the six months to 28 February 2018, published in May 2018, contained several material errors. Both directors resigned in August 2018.
  • In August 2020 the JSE fined AYO R6,5 million for publishing incorrect, false and misleading financial results, having failed to comply with IFRS and the Listings Requirements.
  • Both directors admitted having scant knowledge of corporate governance and of the financial reporting rules for a listed company, and conceded that as inexperienced directors they had not ensured proper financial reporting procedures were in place.
  • The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa welcomed the censure but pointed out that the ban covers listed companies only.

Required (12 marks). With reference to the scenario, explain the shortcomings of AYO’s nomination committee in putting forward Ntsasa and Khoza for directorships.

3.1 What the nomination committee failed to do before it put these two names forward (12 marks)

What the committee is, and what it is for

It is a committee of the board and it carries the board’s authority for this task. Section 72(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 allows the board to appoint committees and to delegate to them any of its authority, and section 72(2)(c) gives a committee the full authority of the board in respect of a matter referred to it. Section 72(3) then makes it plain that neither the delegation nor the committee’s action relieves any director of the duty section 76 imposes.

Its composition is prescribed for a listed issuer. Paragraph 3.84(a) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires a policy detailing the procedures for appointments to the board; requires appointments to be formal and transparent and a matter for the board as a whole, assisted where appropriate by a nomination committee; requires that committee to constitute only non-executive directors of whom the majority must be independent as paragraph 3.84(f)(iii) defines it; and requires it to be chaired by the chairman of the board.

And the code sets the standard the committee is measured by. Recommended practice 34 of King V makes the governing body accountable for the nomination of suitable candidates to serve as its members and for the support of members’ ongoing development, and, where it does not itself nominate, for engaging proactively on its composition requirements with those who have the power to elect or appoint.

The shortcomings, taken in the order in which they occurred

It nominated for eligibility rather than for competence. Section 69(7) and section 69(8) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 say who may not be a director; they say nothing about who should be. A committee that satisfies itself only that a candidate is not disqualified has answered the easier question. Both candidates admitted to scant knowledge of corporate governance and of the rules governing the financial reporting of a listed company, and that is a competence failure the eligibility test does not reach.

It did not test the candidates against the composition the board actually needed. Recommended practice 31 of King V requires the governing body to promote diversity in its membership across a variety of attributes relevant to better decision making and effective governance, including a diverse mix of competencies. A company listing in December 2017 needed, on its audit and risk committee, people who could read a set of interim results against the reporting standards. The committee put forward two people who could not.

It put them straight on to the committee where the deficiency mattered most. Section 94(4)(a) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires each member of the audit committee to be a director who satisfies any applicable prescribed requirements, and section 94(5) allows the Minister to prescribe minimum qualification requirements for members. The audit and risk committee is where financial reporting is tested, and inexperience there is not a matter of degree.

It appears not to have run a documented due diligence at all. A nomination process that is formal and transparent, as paragraph 3.84(a) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires, produces a record: the specification, the candidates considered, the references taken, the interviews, the recommendation and the board’s decision. On the facts as reported there is no sign of one, and its absence is why the shortcoming can be alleged against the committee and not merely against the two individuals.

It nominated without a plan for induction, which is the other half of recommended practice 34. That practice makes the governing body accountable not only for nomination but for the support of members’ ongoing development. A candidate who is honest about a gap can be appointed with a programme to close it. Neither happened here.

It did not staff the committee to survive a departure. One of the three members of the audit and risk committee stepped down on 19 February 2018, leaving two, and the unaudited interim results for the six months to 28 February 2018 were published in May 2018 by a committee reduced to those two. Section 94(2) requires a public company to elect an audit committee comprising at least three members at each annual general meeting, and recommended practice 33 of King V requires a succession plan for the membership of committees. A resignation that leaves a statutory committee short is a nomination failure, not an accident.

It appointed at the moment of greatest reporting risk without adjusting for it. The company listed in December 2017 and published its first set of interim results as a listed company in May 2018. A first reporting cycle under the reporting standards and the JSE Listings Requirements is where an audit committee is tested hardest, and section 94(7)(f) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 requires that committee to report to shareholders on how it carried out its functions. A nomination committee filling those seats months before that cycle needed to weigh experience more heavily, not less.

It did not report to shareholders what it had done. Paragraph 3.84(e) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires a brief curriculum vitae of each director standing for election or re-election to accompany the notice of the meeting, and paragraph 3.84(d) requires the composition of the committees, a brief description of their mandates and the number of meetings held to be disclosed in the annual report. Those disclosures are the point at which a shareholder could have seen what the committee had approved.

And it left the board carrying a duty it could not discharge. Section 76(3)(c) requires each director to act with the degree of care, skill and diligence reasonably expected of a person carrying out the same functions and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. By appointing directors who lacked the knowledge the function required, the committee produced a board whose members could not meet the standard section 76(3)(c) sets for them.

Required (13 marks). Aside from the JSE disqualification, discuss the consequences for Khoza and Ntsasa of accepting the post of non-executive director knowing they were not qualified to do the job.

3.2 What follows for two directors who took the office knowing they could not do the job (13 marks)

The disqualification by the exchange is a contractual sanction and reaches listed companies only. What follows below does not depend on the listing, and most of it does not depend on their having resigned.

Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008

Inexperience is not a defence to section 76(3)(c), and accepting the office is what closes it off. Section 76(3)(c) requires the degree of care, skill and diligence reasonably expected of a person carrying out the same functions and having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. The functions of a member of an audit and risk committee of a listed company are what they are; a director who takes them on is measured against them, and a director who knows he cannot perform them has, by accepting, created the very shortfall section 76(3)(c) measures.

Section 76(4) will not rescue them. The business judgement rule applies only where the director took reasonably diligent steps to become informed, had no disqualifying personal financial interest, and had a rational basis for believing the decision was in the best interests of the company. A director who did not understand the financial reporting he was approving cannot show the first limb or the third.

Section 77(2)(b) is then open. A director is liable in accordance with the principles of the common law relating to delict for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a consequence of a breach of section 76(3)(c). The company published several sets of incorrect, false and misleading results; the R6.5 million fine imposed on the company is a loss with a cause.

And section 77(3)(d) reaches the financial statements directly, though it carries a knowledge requirement. A director is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a direct or indirect consequence of his having signed, consented to or authorised the publication of financial statements that were false or misleading in a material respect – but only where he did so despite knowing that the statement was false, misleading or untrue. Two directors who admitted they did not understand what they were approving may escape section 77(3)(d) on that limb and be caught instead by section 77(2)(b), where no knowledge is required and inexperience is no answer. Section 77(6) makes liability under section 77(3) joint and several.

The statements themselves were unlawful. Section 29(2)(a) provides that annual financial statements must not be false or misleading in any material respect and section 29(2)(b) that they must not be incomplete in any material particular, and section 29(6)(a)(ii) makes it an offence to be a party to their preparation, approval, dissemination or publication knowing that they are materially false or misleading. Section 214(1)(b) reaches a person who, with a fraudulent purpose, knowingly provides false or misleading information where the Act requires it.

Delinquency is the graver exposure, and it is not confined to listed companies. Section 162(5)(c) allows a court to declare a person a delinquent director where, while a director, he grossly abused the position, took personal advantage of information or an opportunity contrary to section 76(2)(a), inflicted harm on the company knowingly, or acted in a manner that amounted to gross negligence, wilful misconduct or breach of trust. Section 162(6)(b) fixes the period for a declaration on that ground: it may be made subject to any conditions the court considers appropriate, including conditions limiting it to particular categories of company, and it subsists for seven years from the date of the order or such longer period as the court determines. The lifetime declaration under section 162(6)(a) is reserved for a person who served while ineligible or disqualified, or who acted in breach of an order of probation.

Probation is the lesser order and it is fitted to exactly this case. Section 162(7) allows a court to place a director under probation where, among other things, he was present at a meeting and failed to vote against a resolution despite the inability of the company to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test, or acted in a manner materially inconsistent with the duties of a director. Section 162(9)(a) allows conditions, including conditions limiting the declaration to particular categories of company, and section 162(9)(b) fixes a period not exceeding five years. Section 162(10)(a) allows the court to order a designated programme of remedial education relevant to the nature of the person’s conduct as a director, and section 162(10)(d)(i) allows an order of probation to require supervision by a mentor in any future participation as a director.

And the people who may bring the application are numerous. Section 162(2) allows a company, a shareholder, a director, a company secretary or prescribed officer, a registered trade union representing employees of the company or another representative of the employees to apply for a declaration of delinquency or an order of probation.

Resignation does not close any of this. Section 24(3)(b)(ii) requires a company to retain, for seven years after a director has retired, the information the Act requires in respect of him. Both resigned in August 2018 and both were before the exchange in 2022; the Act’s remedies run against conduct while in office, not against the office held today.

Under the JSE Listings Requirements, and beyond them

They were bound personally, and they agreed to be. Paragraph 3.62 of the JSE Listings Requirements provides that all directors of issuers are bound by and must comply with the Listings Requirements. The disqualification they received is the exchange’s sanction under that binding.

A fine can follow the censure, and it follows the director rather than the issuer. Paragraph 1.20(a) and paragraph 1.20(b) allow the JSE to censure an issuer or its directors, individually or jointly, privately or publicly; paragraph 1.20(c) allows a fine not exceeding R5 000 000 to be imposed on the issuer or its directors, individually or jointly; and paragraph 1.21(a) allows full particulars of a fine to be published in the Gazette, in national newspapers or through SENS. Paragraph 1.22 allows an unpaid fine to be filed with the registrar of a competent court and to take effect as a civil judgment.

The reputational consequence is the one that outlasts the five years. A public censure and a published disqualification are a permanent, searchable record, and a nomination committee doing its work properly – which is the subject of the first part of this question – will find them.

And the code says what the two of them ought to have done instead. Recommended practice 34 of King V makes the governing body accountable for the nomination of suitable candidates and for the support of members’ ongoing development; recommended practice 38 requires members, collectively and individually, to be accountable for upholding independence in decision making in the best interests of the organisation. A candidate who knows he lacks the knowledge the role requires has two honest courses: decline, or accept on the express condition of an induction and development programme recorded in the board minute as section 73(6)(b) requires. Taking the fee and the title without either is what produced this outcome, and on the textbook view it is the commonest way in which a competent person becomes a delinquent one. That last observation is opinion and is cited as such.

04The company secretary: from "mere servant" to officer of the companyQuestion 4 · 25 marks

The question sets out two old English judgments. In Barnett, Hoares & Co v South London Tramways Co (1887), Lord Esher MR described a company secretary as “a mere servant” with no authority to represent anything. In George Whitechurch Ltd v Cavanagh (1902), Lord Macnaghten described the secretary’s duties as limited and “somewhat humble”. The question notes that this view no longer applies.

Required (25 marks). Your chief executive has asked for a memorandum evaluating the evolving role of the company secretary, including how the roles and responsibilities the Companies Act 71 of 2008 gives the company secretary highlight the characteristics of the ideal holder of the office.

A memorandum on the evolving role of the company secretary (25 marks)

To: The chief executive officer From: The company secretary Subject: How the office has changed since the nineteenth century, what the Companies Act 71 of 2008 now requires of it, and what those requirements say about the person who should hold it

You have asked for an evaluation of the evolving role of the company secretary and of what the duties the Companies Act 71 of 2008 imposes reveal about the characteristics of the ideal holder of the office. This memorandum takes the two nineteenth-century statements as its starting point, because the distance travelled from them is the measure of the change.

Where the two statements come from, and why they are no longer the law

The first statement belongs to an era in which the company secretary had no independent authority at all. A secretary who is a mere servant, who does what he is told and from whom no person may assume any authority to represent anything, is a clerk with a seal. The description was accurate when it was made and it has not been the law for a century.

The second is of the same period and to the same effect. Duties described as of a limited and somewhat humble character describe a recording function and nothing more.

The turn came when the courts recognised that the office carries ostensible authority in administrative matters. In Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd the company secretary was held to be the chief administrative officer of the company, with authority to make contracts in the administrative sphere and to bind the company by them. That is the case which displaced the two statements quoted, and it did so before the office was given any statutory content at all.

The Companies Act 71 of 2008 completed the change by making the office statutory, compulsory for some companies, and answerable to the board rather than to the executive. What follows is that content.

Who must have one, and who may appoint the holder

Section 86(1) makes the appointment compulsory for a public company and for a state-owned company. Section 34(2) leaves a private company, a personal liability company and a non-profit company outside the extended accountability requirements of Chapter 3 except to the extent contemplated in section 84(1)(c) or as required by its own memorandum of incorporation, and section 84(1)(c)(i) expressly excludes Parts B and D of that Chapter from a private company that must be audited. So the office is compulsory for some companies and voluntary for the rest, and a company that adopts it voluntarily takes the whole of Part B with it.

Section 86(2) sets a substantive standard for the holder, however the appointment arises. Every company secretary must have the requisite knowledge of, or experience in, relevant laws, and must be a permanent resident of the Republic and remain so while serving in that capacity.

Section 86(3) allows the first company secretary of a public or state-owned company to be appointed by the incorporators, or within 40 business days after incorporation by the directors or by an ordinary resolution of the holders of the company’s securities, and section 86(3A) applies a corresponding timetable to a company that is required only by its memorandum of incorporation to have one.

Section 86(4) requires the board to fill a vacancy within 60 business days by appointing a person the directors consider to have the requisite knowledge and experience. The office is not permitted to stand empty.

Section 87(1) allows a juristic person or a partnership to hold the office, provided every employee who provides company secretarial services satisfies section 84(5) and at least one of them satisfies section 86.

Section 89(1) allows the company secretary to resign on one month’s written notice, or on less with the approval of the board, and section 89(2) allows a company secretary removed by the board to require the company to include in its annual financial statements a statement of his contention as to the circumstances of the removal, which section 89(4) requires to be included in the directors’ report. That protection exists because the office is expected to say unwelcome things.

What the Act requires of the office, and what each duty implies about the person

Section 88(1) makes the company secretary accountable to the board. Not to the chief executive, and not to the chief financial officer. The single most important characteristic that follows is independence of mind from the executive, exercised without being adversarial towards it.

Section 88(2)(a) requires the office to provide the directors, collectively and individually, with guidance as to their duties, responsibilities and powers. That implies a person who knows the duties in section 75, section 76 and section 77 well enough to explain them to a director in the moment, and who is approachable enough to be asked.

Section 88(2)(b) requires the office to make the directors aware of any law relevant to or affecting the company. That implies a person who reads beyond the Companies Act – the Listings Requirements where the company is listed, the sectoral legislation, the codes the company has adopted – and who can distinguish what binds from what is recommended.

Section 88(2)(c) requires the office to report to the board any failure by the company or a director to comply with the memorandum of incorporation, the rules of the company or the Act. That is the hardest duty in section 88(2) and it implies courage and a written record: the report is to the board, it is not discretionary, and it is not softened because the person at fault is senior.

Section 88(2)(d) requires the office to ensure that minutes of all shareholders meetings, board meetings and meetings of committees of the directors or of the audit committee are properly recorded in accordance with the Act. Read with section 24(3)(d) and section 24(3)(f), which require those records to be kept for seven years, and with section 73(6) and section 73(7)(a), which require the minutes to contain the section 75 declarations and require resolutions to be dated and sequentially numbered, this implies precision and the discipline to write what happened rather than what was intended.

Section 88(2)(e) requires the office to certify in the annual financial statements whether the company has filed required returns and notices in terms of the Act, and whether all such returns and notices appear to be true, correct and up to date. That is a personal certification in a public document, and it implies a person who verifies rather than accepts, and who will not sign what he has not checked.

Section 88(2)(f) requires the office to ensure that a copy of the annual financial statements is sent to every person entitled to it, which is an administrative duty with a legal consequence and implies a system rather than a memory.

Section 88(2)(g) requires the office to carry out the functions of a person designated in terms of section 33(3), which is the person the company designates each year in its annual return as responsible for the company’s compliance with Chapter 3 and with the public regulations concerning its transparency and accountability. Section 33(1) requires the annual return itself.

And section 88(2) is expressed as a floor. The duties of a company secretary include, but are not restricted to the seven listed. The board may add to them, and in a well-run company it does.

What the office has become in practice, beyond the section

Governance adviser to the board rather than clerk to the meeting. Principle 6 of King V governs the committees of the governing body, and recommended practice 59 requires the terms of reference of the audit committee to include reference to its statutory duties. The company secretary drafts and maintains those terms of reference, the board charter and the delegation of authority, and is the person who notices when practice and document have parted company.

Custodian of the record on which every other duty depends. Section 24(1)(a) allows records to be kept in written form or in a form that allows conversion to written form within a reasonable time, and section 24(1)(b) fixes seven years. A modern electronic minute book with controlled access and version history is the present form of the oldest duty in the office.

The channel for disclosures. Section 159(3)(a) names the company secretary among the recipients to whom a disclosure attracts the protections of section 159, and section 159(7)(a) requires a public company or state-owned company to establish and maintain a system to receive disclosures confidentially and act on them.

The board’s conduit to the shareholders. Section 62(1) and section 62(3) govern the notice of a shareholders meeting and its contents, section 61(8) fixes the minimum business of an annual general meeting, and section 63(1) governs shareholder participation. Paragraph 3.84(e) of the JSE Listings Requirements requires a brief curriculum vitae of each director standing for election or re-election to accompany the notice.

And the person who keeps the four levels of authority apart. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 binds; the Companies Regulations, 2011, made under it – regulation 43 for the social and ethics committee under section 72(4), regulation 38 for prescribed officers under section 66(10) – bind on the same terms; the JSE Listings Requirements bind an issuer contractually, with the sanctions in paragraph 1.20; King V is a voluntary code applied on an apply-and-explain basis; and textbook opinion is persuasive only. Collapsing those levels is the commonest error in governance advice, and the company secretary is the person in the room whose job it is not to.

The characteristics of the ideal holder, drawn from the duties above

Technical knowledge that section 86(2)(a) makes a condition of holding the office – of the Act, of the company’s own memorandum of incorporation and rules, and of the instruments that apply to its sector.

Independence of mind, because section 88(1) makes the office accountable to the board and section 88(2)(c) requires it to report failures by the company or by a director.

Integrity, because section 88(2)(e) requires a personal certification and section 29(2)(a) makes it unlawful for financial statements to be false or misleading in any material respect.

Courage, tempered by judgement about timing and audience, because the duty in section 88(2)(c) is discharged badly by a person who either will not raise a matter or cannot raise it without a quarrel.

Precision and method, because section 24(3), section 73(6) and section 73(7)(a) between them turn the record into evidence.

Accessibility, because section 88(2)(a) requires guidance to be given to directors individually as well as collectively – a duty that is discharged in corridors and telephone calls as much as in board papers.

Discretion, because the office holds the company’s unpublished price sensitive information and, where the company is listed, operates the clearance machinery in paragraph 3.66 and the written record required by paragraph 3.68 of the JSE Listings Requirements.

And the standing to be believed. The office has moved from the servant of the first quotation, through the chief administrative officer of Panorama Developments (Guildford) Ltd v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd, to a statutory office with named duties owed to the board. On the textbook view, the practical test of whether a company has made that journey is simple: whether the company secretary is in the room when the difficult decision is taken, and whether anybody asks him what he thinks. That is opinion and it is cited as such.

Studying CSP-04

Every answer above does the same three things: it states the provision, applies it to the facts in the scenario, and says what would have been different. The complete CSP-04 course carries the packs and five parts of notes covering the 2026 outline, written the same way.

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