TheronGroup of Consultants

80/20 Golden Rule · Pareto Optimality

Worked example

CL-04: when one director binds the company, the Bubbly Sip case

CGISA's October 2024 Corporate Law Question 4 worked in full: capacity, constructive notice, the Turquand rule and ostensible authority for a lone director.

Question 4 of CGISA’s October 2024 CL-04 Corporate Law paper, worth 25 marks, gives you a director who signs up a building contractor without the board’s mandate and asks whether the company has to pay. It is an authority question, and the marks go to working the routes by which a company is bound in their proper order, each tied to its section of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 or the case that states it. The question is described in our own words below; the answers are TheronGroup’s.

The question

Bubbly Sip (Pty) Ltd exists to buy immovable property and resell it when the market is right. It has four directors, and its Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) says that all four must be present to form a quorum for any business outside the ordinary course.

One director, Bongani, decided that a property the company had bought two years earlier, Lushaka Ridge, would sell for considerably more if it were renovated first. Acting on his own, he engaged Smart Build CC to do the work. In the negotiations he described himself to Smart Build’s member as the company’s managing director, which he was not. Two of his co-directors, Bobby and Rick, were present at one of those meetings. Smart Build did the work and invoiced R600 000. The company refused to pay, saying it was not bound by a contract Bongani had no authority to make, and Smart Build sued.

Required. 4.1 Evaluate whether Bubbly Sip is bound by the contract Bongani concluded with Smart Build CC. (15) 4.2 Discuss whether there is any legal basis on which Bongani, or any other director of Bubbly Sip acting alone, can conclude contracts that bind the company. (10)

4.1 Is Bubbly Sip bound?

A contract concluded in a company’s name binds it only if two things are true: the company had the capacity to enter into it, and the person who acted for it had authority to do so. Bubbly Sip disputes only the second, but a full answer deals with both, because the order of the analysis is part of what is marked.

Capacity is not the problem

Under section 19(1)(b) a company has all the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except where a juristic person cannot exercise a power or where its MOI provides otherwise. A stated main object restricts the company’s purposes, but a restricted company’s capacity has always extended to what is reasonably incidental to its main object. Renovating a property the company already owns so that it sells for more is a step in the resale, not a departure from it.

Even if the renovation had fallen outside the main object, capacity would not decide the case. Section 20(1)(a) provides that no action of the company is void merely because a limitation in its MOI prohibited it, or because the directors had no authority as a result of that limitation. Section 20(1)(b) then bars anyone, outside proceedings between the company and its own shareholders, directors or prescribed officers, from relying on the limitation to argue that the action is void.

Smart Build is not deemed to know about the quorum clause

Section 19(4) abolished the doctrine of constructive notice: no one is regarded as knowing what a company document says merely because it has been filed or can be inspected. Section 19(5)(a) keeps one exception. A person is regarded as knowing a restrictive condition or prohibition in the MOI (section 15(2)(b) or (c)) where the company’s name carries the “RF” suffix (section 11(3)(b)) and its Notice of Incorporation or a Notice of Amendment has drawn attention to the provision.

Bubbly Sip trades as “(Pty) Ltd”, with no “RF”. Smart Build is therefore not fixed with knowledge of the four-director quorum. The point matters because deemed knowledge that a director lacks authority would destroy any ostensible authority he might otherwise have.

Bongani had no actual authority

Section 66(1) places the business and affairs of the company under the management or direction of the board, which may exercise all the company’s powers except where the Act or the MOI provides otherwise. The power is the board’s, held collectively. An individual director has only the authority the board, or someone the board has empowered, delegates to him (Kaimowitz v Delahunt 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC)).

Actual authority is either express, given in so many words, or implied, inferred from the principal’s conduct or necessarily incidental to express authority. The facts show no board resolution, no delegation and no mandate to Bongani of any kind.

He had no usual authority either, and he cannot create it himself

The office a person holds can carry usual authority. A managing director’s usual authority is wide, and someone dealing with one in good faith may assume he has the powers his position appears to give him (SA Securities Ltd v Nicholas 1911 TPD 450). An ordinary director has no such wide authority; he must have actual authority or be held out as having it (Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties (Pty) Ltd 1961 (2) SA 257 (W)).

Bongani was not the managing director, so the office cannot clothe him. His own statement to Smart Build that he held it does not help. The representation that founds authority must come from the principal. An agent cannot give himself ostensible authority by saying he has it, or every company would be bound by any self-appointed agent.

Where the marks are lost. Candidates treat Bongani’s claim to be managing director as the representation that binds the company. It is the agent’s representation, and it carries no weight. Look for a representation by the company, through the board or people with authority to manage its business, and in this case that means the co-directors who sat in the meeting.

The Turquand rule helps Smart Build less than it seems

At common law, a person contracting with a company in good faith may assume that its internal formalities have been complied with and need not enquire (Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327, adopted in Legg & Co v Premier Tobacco Co 1926 AD 132). Quorum requirements are the standard example of an internal formality. Section 20(7) puts the rule in statute: a person dealing with the company in good faith, other than a director, prescribed officer or shareholder, may presume that the company complied with the formal and procedural requirements of the Act, its MOI and its rules, unless that person knew or reasonably ought to have known of the non-compliance. Section 20(8) keeps the common-law rule alongside the statutory one. Smart Build, a close corporation with no position inside Bubbly Sip, is the kind of outsider the rule protects.

The company’s answer is a strong one and must be stated. The rule lets an outsider assume that a procedure was followed. It does not let the outsider assume that the board delegated its powers to a particular individual. No board decision was taken here at all, so the defect is not a formality that was skipped but a mandate that was never given, and the rule does not reach that. The statutory version also excludes a party who reasonably ought to have known of the non-compliance, and the more unusual the transaction, the stronger the case that the outsider should have enquired. The courts are also divided on whether the rule operates only once ostensible authority is established (One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings (Pty) Ltd 2015 (4) SA 623 (WCC)) or independently of it (Mine Workers’ Union v Prinsloo 1948 (3) SA 831 (A)). On either view, Smart Build’s better route is to prove authority directly.

Ostensible authority is where Smart Build wins

Ostensible authority arises where the principal, by words or conduct, represents to a third party that the agent has authority, and the third party reasonably relies on it. The principal is then estopped from denying the authority. Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 630 (CA) requires a representation that the agent may conclude contracts of this kind, made by someone with actual authority to manage the company’s business, which induced the third party to contract. NBS Bank Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 2002 (1) SA 396 (SCA) lists six elements: a representation by words or conduct; made by the principal; in a form the principal should reasonably have expected outsiders to act on; reliance on it; reasonable reliance; and resulting prejudice. The third party bears the onus.

Apply them to the facts:

  1. Representation by conduct. Bobby and Rick sat in a negotiation in which Bongani dealt for the company and called himself its managing director, and they did not correct him. Silence in those circumstances is conduct.
  2. Made by the principal. The company’s strongest objection is here: individual directors have only delegated authority, and no board decision was taken. It does not prevail on these facts. Bongani, Bobby and Rick are three of the four directors, a majority. Under section 73(5)(b), unless the MOI says otherwise, a majority of directors must be present before a vote may be called. This MOI departs from that only for business outside the ordinary course. Renovating stock-in-trade property for resale is the ordinary business of a property-trading company, so a majority of the board acquiescing in Bongani’s conduct of the negotiations is conduct attributable to the board.
  3. Reasonable expectation that outsiders would act on it, and reasonable reliance. The contract concerned a property the company already owned, for a purpose that served its stated business, and nothing in the company’s name or the dealings put Smart Build on notice. In Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) the majority found the representation in the company clothing the person concerned with the indicia of authority. Bubbly Sip did that by letting Bongani negotiate, in front of a majority of its board, as its managing director.
  4. Prejudice. Smart Build supplied R600 000 of services and materials for the company’s benefit.

Conclusion. Bubbly Sip is bound and must pay Smart Build. The contract was within its capacity; Smart Build is not deemed to know of the quorum clause; the clause in any event governs business outside the ordinary course; and although Bongani had neither actual nor usual authority, and the Turquand rule cannot supply a delegation that was never made, the company held him out through a majority of its board and is estopped from denying it.

The company has recourse against Bongani. Exceeding his authority is a breach of fiduciary duty, for which section 77(2)(a) makes him liable to the company for the loss it suffers. Section 77(3)(a) adds liability for loss the company sustains because a director purported to bind it despite knowing that he lacked the authority to do so, and Bongani knew he was not the managing director. The company could also put the matter beyond argument by ratifying the contract; where an MOI limitation is involved, section 20(2) allows the shareholders to ratify by special resolution, provided the act does not contravene the Act (section 20(3)).

Where the marks are lost. Two ways. First, stopping at “Bongani had no authority, so the company is not bound”, which ignores estoppel and loses most of the 15 marks. Second, jumping straight to the Turquand rule without noticing that it presumes formalities, not appointments. Work capacity, then constructive notice, then actual, usual and ostensible authority, and place Turquand where it belongs.

4.2 Can a single director ever bind the company?

Yes, but only on a basis the board creates. The starting point is section 66(1): authority is vested in the board collectively, and a director has no right as director to act for the company alone (Kaimowitz v Delahunt). Four routes lead from there to a binding contract, and one presumption supports them.

  1. Actual authority, express or implied. The board can mandate a director by resolution taken at a properly convened and quorate meeting; a purported resolution of a board that is not properly constituted is a nullity. For Bubbly Sip, ordinary-course business needs the section 73(5)(b) default, a majority (three of four directors), while business outside the ordinary course needs all four, as the MOI requires. A director mandated to sell Lushaka Ridge would also have implied authority for whatever is reasonably incidental to that sale.
  2. Usual authority attaching to an office. Appointing a director to an executive office, above all managing director, implicitly authorises him to do what falls within the usual scope of that office, and a managing director’s usual scope is wide. This is the route Bongani claimed and did not have. Had the board actually appointed him, the contract would have bound the company without more. A chairperson or an ordinary director carries no comparable usual authority (Wolpert v Uitzigt Properties).
  3. Ostensible authority. The board, by words or conduct, holds a director out as authorised, and the third party reasonably relies on it, under the Freeman and Lockyer and NBS Bank requirements set out above. The representation must come from the company, not the director. A ring-fenced company is the limit: where section 19(5)(a) fixes the third party with knowledge of a restriction on authority, there can be no ostensible authority that contradicts it.
  4. Ratification. The company can adopt an unauthorised contract after the event, expressly or by conduct, with retrospective effect. Where the MOI limits the directors’ authority, section 20(2) allows the shareholders to ratify by special resolution, but section 20(3) prohibits ratification of anything that contravenes the Act.

The presumption. Section 20(7), read with section 20(8), lets an outsider dealing in good faith presume that internal formalities were complied with. It protects the counterparty of a director the board did authorise; it does not create the authorisation. It is also not available to insiders: a director, prescribed officer or shareholder cannot rely on it, though a director contracting with the company in a purely personal capacity may stand as an outsider (Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd [1967] 3 All ER 98 (CA)).

Without one of these, a director acting alone binds only himself. He is exposed to the company under sections 77(2)(a) and 77(3)(a), and to the counterparty for breach of warranty of authority or misrepresentation, with damages measured to put the counterparty where it would have been had the company been bound.

Where the marks are lost. Listing “actual, ostensible, usual” as labels earns little. Each route needs its source (the board’s resolution, the appointment to an office, the board’s representation, the later adoption) and a sentence applying it to Bubbly Sip’s four directors and its MOI quorum.

Studying CL-04

CL-04 problem questions are marked on applying the Companies Act and the leading cases to the facts, in a defensible order. The CL-04 course has eight parts of notes on the 2026 syllabus outline and 12 examination papers worked from October 2018 to October 2024, with three assignments, at R5 000 a year.

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