Question 1.1 of MANCOSA’s CGER8 Corporate Governance, Ethics and Risk final summative assessment of 9 December 2020, worth 10 marks, opens Section A on a news report about Eskom: its chairman had also become its interim chief executive, and the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa had objected. The question asks whether that was wrong, and the marks go to the justification. The paper was set under King IV, which applied to financial years before 2026; King V, released on 31 October 2025, applies to financial years starting on or after 1 January 2026, and its equivalent practices are given alongside. The question is described in our own words below; the answers are TheronGroup’s.
The question
The extract is a July 2019 news report. After Eskom’s chief executive, Phakamani Hadebe, resigned, the board’s chairman, Jabu Mabuza, was announced as interim chief executive for three months while he remained chairman. He described himself as a placeholder providing leadership stability, said he had taken on the role at the minister’s request, and undertook not to stay longer than three months. Eskom had already begun advertising for a permanent group chief executive.
Parmi Natesan, chief executive of the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, said the arrangement fell short of the King Code, which holds that the roles of chair and CEO are distinct and should be kept rigorously separate: the chair leads the board in overseeing management, and the CEO leads the management that answers to the board. She accepted that, as a temporary measure to stabilise a transition, it might be in Eskom’s interests, and set three conditions: the lead independent director should take an active role, the permanent appointment should be made transparently, and Mabuza’s interim tenure should not be extended while he remained chair. A senior official of the governing party also said the party was concerned and would raise it with the Minister of Public Enterprises.
Required. Is there anything wrong with Jabu Mabuza taking on the roles of both chief executive and chairman of the Eskom board? Justify your answer. (10 marks)
The rule the arrangement breaks
Start with the rule, because the justification depends on it. Under King IV, the governing body should elect an independent non-executive member as its chair (Principle 7, recommended practice 31), and the CEO should not also chair the governing body (Principle 7, recommended practice 34). The CEO leads the implementation of approved strategy and is the chief link between management and the governing body (Principle 10, recommended practice 77), which is the principle Natesan relied on: the CEO’s role is defined by accountability to the board, so it cannot be held by the person who leads the board.
The reason is the board’s function. Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that a company’s business and affairs are managed by or under the direction of its board, and section 76(3) requires each director to act in good faith, for a proper purpose, in the company’s best interests and with reasonable care, skill and diligence. Eskom is also a public entity under the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, under which its board is the accounting authority (section 49(2)(a)). A board that is to direct and hold management to account cannot be led by the person it holds to account. Agency theory gives the same answer from the other side: the board exists to monitor management on the owner’s behalf, and a monitor who is also the person monitored has stopped monitoring.
King V keeps the rule and words it more directly: the CEO should not also chair the governing body (King V, Principle 5, recommended practice 48), the chairperson should be an independent non-executive member (recommended practice 45), and where the chairperson is not independent, a lead independent position should be instituted for as long as that situation lasts (recommended practice 45), with recommended practice 47 setting the minimum occasions on which one is needed.
Where the marks are lost. Saying “King IV says the roles must be separate” without the reason. The marks for justification are in why separation matters: the chair leads oversight, the CEO is overseen, and one person cannot do both. Cite the practice, then explain it.
What was wrong on Eskom’s facts
The board lost its independent vantage point. For as long as the arrangement lasted, the board’s assessment of management, at a utility whose central problem was the reliability of electricity supply, was led by the person answerable for it. That is the oversight failure the rule exists to prevent, at the organisation where it mattered most.
The appointment came from the shareholder, not from the board’s own process. Mabuza said he had accepted the role from the minister. Appointing the CEO is the board’s responsibility, and where a board does not hold that power, King V expects it to engage the party that does on the profile and the process (King V, Principle 7, recommended practice 76). Taking the decision outside the board weakens the line between shareholder and board as well as the line between board and management.
There was no successor ready. An unplanned resignation left a strategically critical state-owned company with no successor ready to step in, which is why the chair filled the gap and which points to a gap in succession planning for the CEO, a matter the board is expected to oversee (King V, Principle 7, recommended practice 79).
The temporary arrangement outlasted its terms. The announced three months ran to more than five. André de Ruyter was announced as group chief executive in November 2019 and took office in January 2020, and Mabuza resigned as chairman on 10 January 2020, days before De Ruyter started. Natesan’s third condition was not met.
The causal chain can be set out exactly. The cause was an unplanned resignation with no successor; the risk event was executive and oversight authority held by one person for an open-ended period; the consequence was a board with no independent position from which to test management’s assurances on supply, and accountability that then fell on the chairman personally instead of being exercised by the board over management.
Where the marks are lost. Answering in the abstract. Ten marks need the facts: who appointed him, how long it lasted against what was promised, and what the board could no longer do while he held both roles.
The case for the arrangement
A justified answer weighs the other side. King IV operates on an “apply and explain” basis, not a mandatory one, and a governing body may depart from a practice if it explains how the principle is still achieved. Natesan herself accepted that a short interim arrangement to stabilise the organisation might serve Eskom’s interests. King IV’s own mechanism for a chair who is not independent is a lead independent director who strengthens the board’s independence and leads the chair’s appraisal (Principle 7, recommended practice 32). And Eskom met one of her conditions: the permanent post was advertised and filled within about four months.
The verdict
Yes, there was something wrong with it, in principle and in practice. In principle, because the defining feature of board oversight is that the overseer is not the overseen, and no explanation of circumstances restores that once the two roles are combined. In practice, because the appointment originated with the minister rather than the board, no succession plan was in place, and the arrangement ran well past the three months on which the Institute’s qualified acceptance rested. It could have been a defensible temporary departure if the lead independent director had been shown to be actively overseeing the interim chief executive and if it had ended when promised. On the record, it was a departure without the explanation “apply and explain” requires.
Where the marks are lost. A one-word “yes” or “no”. The question says “justify”, so the answer needs a reasoned verdict that deals with Natesan’s concession and the apply-and-explain basis before rejecting them on the facts.
Studying CGER8
CGER8’s final assessment is set out of 100 marks: 40 compulsory marks on a set article, and three 20-mark questions chosen from four. The CGER8 course has model answers on Eskom, VBS Mutual Bank, KPMG SA, Lehman Brothers and other case sets, at R1 450 for the complete module.