Question 3 of UNISA’s October/November 2023 AUI4861 Advanced Internal Audit Practice paper, worth 20 marks, hands you an extract from an internal audit charter and asks you to review it as the chief audit executive. The faults sit in the wording, and the marks go to finding each one and fixing it with the provision it breaks. The question is described in our own words below; the answers are TheronGroup’s.
The question
You are the chief audit executive (CAE) of Dig Deep Ltd, a Johannesburg manufacturer of mining equipment. The audit committee keeps asking internal audit for services the charter does not cover. The charter exists but has not been reviewed in seven years, and it is signed by the CAE and the chief executive officer. Its sections 6 to 9 provide, in substance, that:
- Section 6, organisation: the CAE reports to the board administratively and to the CEO functionally.
- Section 7, independence and objectivity: the CAE keeps the activity free of conditions that threaten unbiased work, and internal auditors have no operational responsibility for activities they audit; but internal auditors are also to help with particular operational duties when asked.
- Section 8, responsibilities: (a) an annual risk-based plan goes to senior management and the board for their information; (b) the activity must collectively hold the competencies the charter requires; (c) internal audit sets the organisation’s risk appetite and reviews how key risks are managed; (d) quarterly reports go to management and the audit committee once the CEO has approved them; and (e) internal audit oversees and monitors management’s handling of fraud risk.
- Section 9, quality: the activity will keep a quality assurance and improvement programme covering all its aspects, and says nothing more.
Required. Review the charter against the International Professional Practices Framework (IPPF), identify and explain its shortcomings, and recommend improvements, in two columns: the shortcoming and its explanation, and the recommendation with its IPPF reference. (20)
Twenty marks across two columns means about ten complete rows, each with the fault explained and the fix cited. The facts support twelve. The Standards cited are the 2017 IIA Standards the paper was set under; the governance practices are cited to King V. Section 8(b) is sound, since Standard 1210 requires the activity to hold or obtain the competencies it needs collectively, and leaving it alone is part of the review.
What the charter leaves out
Five of the shortcomings are omissions, so they are found by comparing the charter with what Standard 1000 says a charter must contain, not by reading the extract.
1. Seven years without review.
- Shortcoming: the mandate has never been tested against Dig Deep’s present structure, risks and governance, and neither senior management nor the board has had to confirm that it still agrees to it.
- Recommendation: the CAE must review the charter periodically and present it to senior management and the board for approval (Standard 1000). Fix the review as annual and record the date of each review and approval in the charter.
2. Approved by the CAE and the CEO, not by the board.
- Shortcoming: the charter has been approved by the auditor and by the head of the management being audited, and not by the board, to which internal audit is functionally accountable.
- Recommendation: final approval of the charter rests with the board (Standard 1000, Interpretation). The governing body considers and approves the charter and may delegate this to the audit committee (King V, Principle 12, recommended practices 128 and 129). The signature block should carry the audit committee chairperson’s approval on the board’s behalf.
3. No definition of the services internal audit provides.
- Shortcoming: this is why the audit committee’s requests keep arriving for services the charter does not cover, and why each one has to be argued afresh.
- Recommendation: the charter must define the nature of assurance services, including any assurance given to parties outside the organisation (Standard 1000.A1), and the nature of consulting services (Standard 1000.C1). Add both, and bring the committee’s recurring requests within them.
4. No authority and no right of access.
- Shortcoming: nothing in sections 6 to 9 authorises access to records, personnel or physical properties, so when access is refused the CAE has no instrument to point to.
- Recommendation: the charter must establish the activity’s position and authorise access to the records, personnel and physical properties relevant to its engagements (Standard 1000, Interpretation), and the CAE’s position must carry the necessary authority (King V, Principle 12, recommended practice 129(b)(ii)). Insert an unrestricted-access clause.
5. No recognition of the mandatory guidance.
- Shortcoming: the charter adopts no internal audit standard, so there is no stated measure against which the activity’s work can be held.
- Recommendation: the charter must recognise the mandatory nature of the Core Principles, the Code of Ethics, the Standards and the Definition of Internal Auditing (Standard 1010), and should provide for adopting an authoritative internal audit standard (King V, Principle 12, recommended practice 129(a)).
Where the marks are lost. Candidates review only the sentences printed and miss the five faults that are absences. Before reading the extract, list what a charter must contain (purpose, authority, responsibility, position, access, services, recognition of the mandatory guidance, board approval) and then tick off what is there.
Section 6: the reporting lines are inverted
6. Functional reporting to the CEO.
- Shortcoming: reporting functionally to the CEO puts the CAE’s plan, budget and findings under the executive whose management is the subject of the audits, which removes organisational independence. Administrative reporting to the board is the wrong way round as well.
- Recommendation: the CAE must report to a level that lets the activity fulfil its responsibilities, achieved by functional reporting to the board (Standard 1110, Interpretation). The CAE reports to the audit committee chairperson on internal audit matters and to a designated executive on administrative matters (King V, Principle 12, recommended practice 129(b)(iv)). Reverse section 6, and have the CAE confirm organisational independence to the board at least annually (Standard 1110).
Where the marks are lost. Saying only that “the CAE should report to the audit committee” earns half the row. The fix is a split: functionally to the board through the audit committee, administratively to a named executive. State both lines.
Section 7: independence granted and then taken back
7. Operational help on request.
- Shortcoming: the section first says internal auditors carry no operational responsibility for what they audit, then requires them to take on operational duties when asked, authorising the very impairment it has just prohibited.
- Recommendation: internal auditors must not assess operations they were previously responsible for, and objectivity is presumed impaired if they give assurance on an activity they were responsible for in the past year (Standard 1130.A1). Delete the second sentence. Any help to management should be defined as a consulting service (Standard 1000.C1), and any impairment disclosed (Standard 1130).
Section 8: three responsibilities that belong to others
8. The plan goes to the board for information only.
- Shortcoming: the board notes the plan but never accepts responsibility for the coverage it gives or the risks it leaves out, and management can change it without the board’s leave.
- Recommendation: the CAE must communicate the plan and resource requirements, including significant interim changes, to senior management and the board for review and approval (Standard 2020), and the governing body approves a risk-based internal audit plan (King V, Principle 12, recommended practice 130). Replace submission for information with submission for review and approval.
9. Internal audit sets the risk appetite.
- Shortcoming: deciding how much risk the organisation will take is the governing body’s decision. An activity that set the appetite would later be evaluating its own decision when it reviews risk management.
- Recommendation: the governing body determines the nature and extent of the risks the organisation is willing to take (King V, Principle 8, recommended practice 93(b)), while internal audit evaluates the effectiveness of risk management and helps improve it (Standard 2120). Reword section 8(c) to that evaluative role.
10. Reports released only after the CEO approves them.
- Shortcoming: the audited party decides what reaches the audit committee, so a finding adverse to the CEO could be suppressed.
- Recommendation: the activity must be free from interference in communicating results, and the CAE must disclose any interference to the board (Standard 1110.A1). The CAE decides to whom results are communicated (Standard 2440). Remove the CEO’s approval.
11. Internal audit oversees management’s fraud-risk actions.
- Shortcoming: overseeing fraud-risk management is a management and governing-body function. An activity that oversaw it could not later give objective assurance on it.
- Recommendation: internal audit must evaluate the potential for fraud and how the organisation manages fraud risk (Standard 2120.A2), and must monitor what management does with the results it reports (Standard 2500). Reword section 8(e) to those two duties.
Where the marks are lost. Striking out 8(c) and 8(e) altogether loses the recommendation mark, because internal audit does have a role in both. The marks go to rewriting each into the evaluative duty the Standards give: evaluating risk management, not setting appetite; evaluating fraud risk management, not running it.
Section 9: a quality programme in one sentence
12. No internal assessment, external assessment or reporting.
- Shortcoming: the section commits to a programme but specifies none of its parts, so no one could ever be shown to have failed to comply with it.
- Recommendation: the programme must include ongoing monitoring and periodic self-assessments (Standard 1311), an external assessment at least once every five years by a qualified, independent assessor from outside the organisation (Standard 1312), and reporting of the results to senior management and the board (Standard 1320). King V asks the governing body to ensure the same five-yearly external review (Principle 12, recommended practice 131(f)).
Under the Global Internal Audit Standards
The IIA’s Global Internal Audit Standards replaced the 2017 Standards from 9 January 2025. The same faults are found under the new numbering.
| Shortcoming | 2017 Standards | Global Internal Audit Standards |
|---|---|---|
| Review and board approval of the charter; services, access and adherence to the Standards | 1000, 1000.A1, 1000.C1, 1010 | 6.1 Internal Audit Mandate; 6.2 Internal Audit Charter |
| Reporting lines and interference | 1110, 1110.A1 | 7.1 Organizational Independence |
| Operational duties | 1130, 1130.A1 | 2.1 Individual Objectivity; 2.2 Safeguarding Objectivity |
| Plan approved by the board | 2020 | 9.4 Internal Audit Plan |
| Quality programme | 1300 to 1320 | 8.3 Quality; 8.4 External Quality Assessment; 12.1 Internal Quality Assessment |
Studying AUI4861
AUI4861 papers are scenario-based, and the marks go to applying the internal audit standards to the facts given, not to reciting them. The AUI4861 course holds six topic notes, with 16 examination sittings and 13 years of assignments worked from 2011 to 2024, at R3 000 a year.